The effect of payoff tables on experimental oligopoly behavior by Gürerk, Özgür & Selten, Reinhard
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effect of payoff tables on
experimental oligopoly behavior
O¨zgu¨r Gu¨rerk and Reinhard Selten
University of Erfurt, CEREB
29 April 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34895/
MPRA Paper No. 34895, posted 22 November 2011 14:30 UTC
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
The Effect of Payoff Tables on Experimental Oligopoly
Behavior
O¨zgu¨r Gu¨rerk · Reinhard Selten
Received: date / Accepted: date
Abstract We explore the effects of the provision of an information-processing
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experimental setting, subjects have access to payoff tables whereas in the other
setting they have not. It turns out that this minor variation in presentation
has non-negligible effects on participants’ behavior, particularly in the initial
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be more cooperative. As a consequence, collusive behavior is more likely and
quickly to occur.
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21 Introduction
Payoff tables1 are widely used as an informational aid in experimental eco-
nomics since its beginnings. Some of the pioneering studies on oligopolies adopt
payoff tables (Fouraker and Siegel 1963; Sauermann and Selten 1967; Dolbear
et al. 1968) as well as recent ones (e.g., Abbink and Brandts 2008, the majority
of the studies reviewed in Huck et al. 2004). The influence of this device on
subjects’ behavior, however, has not yet been explored systematically. With
this study, we try to fill this gap.
We conduct a series of Cournot market experiments with two presentational
settings that differ slightly. In one setting named TAB, subjects are provided
with payoff tables whereas they are not in the other setting (noTAB). Our
main research interest concerns whether subjects in the two settings behave
differently. In the context of an oligopoly, we may re-formulate our research
question: Do competitors with an information processing aid tend to be more
collusive than competitors without such an aid? To check whether the possible
effects of payoff tables are robust with respect to market size, we conduct
experiments with two, three, and four competitors.2
Previous studies show that slight differences in information presentation
may indeed have effects on subject’s behavior. Pruitt (1967), for instance, re-
ports more cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game if the payoff structure
of the game is presented to subjects in the decomposed form. In a public
goods experiment, Saijo and Nakamura (1995) provide subjects either with a
“rough” table containing basic payoff information or a “detailed” table that is
comparable to the payoff table we provide. They find, if the marginal capita
per return is high (and resp. low), average contributions to the public goods
are higher with detailed tables (resp. lower) than the investments with rough
tables. Huck et al. (1999) find that markets tend to become less competitive if
more information about demand and cost conditions are present, while more
information about competitors’ quantities and profits yields more competitive
behavior. Bosch-Dome`nech and Vriend (2003) investigate imitation behavior
in Cournot markets by varying the presentation of market information. They
observe that the imitation frequency does not increase when the informa-
tion retrieval gets more complex. In a gift-exchange experiment, Charness et
al. (2004) find significant reductions in both wages and worker effort when
subjects are provided with payoff tables compared to the baseline treatment
without payoff tables. Requate and Waichman (2011) report no differences in
behavior in Cournot duopoly experiments whether subjects are provided with
payoff tables or use a payoff calculator. The studies of Charness et al. (2004)
1 A payoff table is a matrix that depicts the payoff of player i for all possible combinations
of i’s and the opponent’s actions. For example, in a Cournot market, the payoff table displays
player i’s payoff for all combinations of i’s production choice and the competitors’ total
production.
2 See Huck et al. (2004) for a general discussion of number effects in quantity setting
oligopolies.
3and especially, Requate and Waichman (2011) are closely related to ours.3 In
the last section of the paper, we will discuss and compare the findings of these
studies to our results.
The payoff table we use in our study (see Appendix) reduces the complexity
of the payoff structure by presenting all possible payoffs in a crystal clear
way. This may help subjects to realize better what alternatives they have
and what the consequences of these alternatives are. In particular, subjects
may identify collusive quantities more easily. Hence, we conjecture that payoff
tables should lead to more collusive behavior. On the other hand, one can
think of an alternative conjecture: with payoff tables, subjects could also easily
identify best-replies. This could drive the results more in the direction of Nash-
equilibrium.
Our results show for all market sizes, average total quantities are lower
when subjects are provided with payoff tables, i.e., in TAB, the markets
are more collusive. In the initial phase of the experiment, the differences be-
tween both settings are most pronounced. Subjects provided with payoff tables
choose more often collusive quantities. Over time, however, the differences be-
tween both settings get smaller.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and procedure. Section 4 is dedicated to the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Since we focus on the impact of payoff tables we use a very simple Cournot
model. In a Cournot oligopoly, N symmetric firms compete in a market where
a homogenous good is sold. By xi we denote the single quantity produced by
the firm i (production is limited to 60 units per period). The total market
production, i.e., the sum of xi is represented by X. To simplify the problem
without changing its nature we set the cost of production to zero. Furthermore,
we assume a linear market demand where the computer “buys” the total pro-
duction. The resulting price is denoted with p and the inverse demand function
then is p = max {60−X, 0}. The firms decide simultaneously on xi. The profit
of firm i is given by pii = (60−X)xi for X ≤ 60 and pii = 0 for X > 60.
For each market size, one can easily calculate the Cournot-equilibrium,
which is the only pure Nash-equilibrium of the stage game yielding positive
profits for each player. We refer to this equilibrium as the Cournot-Nash-
equilibrium (henceforth CNE).4 The CNE is the first theoretical benchmark
to which we will compare the experimental results. The second benchmark to
which we refer is collusion where all competitors act as if they were a single
monopolist to maximize their joint profits. The third benchmark is the com-
petitive outcome where firms maximize their profits given the market clearing
3 The two main differences between the study of Requate and Waichman and ours are:
first we investigate the effect of an informational aid (payoff table) to no aid at all. Second
we investigate the possible effect not only for duopolies but for three different market sizes.
4 The stage game also has other pure equilibria, e.g., xi = 60 for i = 1...n.
4price. Many experimental studies refer to these three benchmarks of quantity-
setting oligopoly (see e.g., Offerman et al. 2002). Table 1 depicts the total
quantities and prices in markets with two, three, and four competitors for the
respective benchmarks.
Table 1 Total quantity and prices at benchmark outcomes
Collusion CNE Competition
Market size X p X p X p
N = 2 30 30 40 20 60 0
N = 3 30 30 45 15 60 0
N = 4 30 30 48 12 60 0
3 Experimental design
Our experimental design contains two informational settings (noTAB, TAB)
and three market sizes, i.e., we have six experimental treatments. We con-
ducted 10 independent observations per treatment; in total 180 students par-
ticipated in ten experimental sessions. 5After the participants had entered the
laboratory, the instructor read aloud the instructions6 to make sure that ev-
ery participant heard the information at least once and to create common
knowledge. The subjects’ assignment to different markets was random but
fixed for the duration of the experiment. Communication was not allowed. A
market period consisted of a decision and a feedback phase. After the sub-
jects made their quantity decisions, all competitors received feedback about
all single quantities and profits in their market. The participants played 100
experimental periods that lasted two and half hours on average including the
introduction. The average payoff was about 18 Euros. The experiments were
programmed with the experimental programming toolbox RatImage (Abbink
and Sadrieh 1995).
4 Results
4.1 Aggregate Behavior
On the aggregate level, there is a clear difference between both settings. Figure
1 depicts for each treatment average total quantities in blocks of ten periods.
5 We had 2+2=4 sessions with 20 subjects each for the quadropoly treatments; 2+2=4
sessions with 15 subjects each for the triopolies; and 1+1=2 sessions with 20 subjects each
for the duopoly treatments. Most of the participants were students who were recruited from
economics, law, and social sciences departments.
6 For an English translation of the instructions, see the Appendix. The original instruc-
tions in German are available upon request from the authors.
5Fig. 1 Average numbers in different phases
For all market sizes and for almost all blocks, the average total quantity is
lower in TAB than in noTAB.
The effect of payoff tables emerges early in the experiment. Averaged over
the first five periods, in TAB -markets subjects choose significantly more often
(U-Test, p = 0.007) single collusive quantities7 (49% of all decisions) than
subjects in noTAB (29% of all decisions).8
How do average quantities evolve during the experiment? In order to study
this issue we compare data from periods 1-30 to the averages of periods 61-
90.9 In noTAB -duopolies, average quantities significantly decrease in later
periods (Wilcoxon matched pairs test, p = 0.059). In TAB -duopolies, there is
no significant decrease since subjects here – in contrast to their counterparts
in noTAB – choose low production levels already in the initial phase of the
experiment. For N = 3 and N = 4, in TAB, over time, we observe a trend
to more collusive quantities when subjects are provided with payoff tables.
The average total quantity in the later periods is lower (N = 3 : p = 0.093,
N = 4 : p = 0.114) than in the early periods 1-30.10 In contrast, in these
markets in noTAB setting, there is no decrease of quantities.
A closer look on the three figures reveals a non-monotonicity of the effect
of payoff tables, i.e., for N = 3 the differences between TAB and noTAB are
more pronounced than the differences for N = 2 and N = 4. In duopolies,
7 Single collusive quantities are closer to the symmetric collusive benchmark than to other
benchmarks. For example, in duopolies, the symmetric collusive benchmark quantity is 15
while the single quantity in CNE is 20. Hence, all single quantities closer to 15 than to 20
are counted as collusive single quantities.
8 The reported non-parametric statistical tests use the session averages of independent
observations and report two-sided p-values.
9 We do not consider the last 10 periods to exclude possible end game effects.
10 Compared to other studies (e.g., reported in Huck et al., 2004) the average quantity
in TAB-quadropolies could be considered as somewhat high. However, if we exclude one
strong outlier market with 142.3(!) units, the average market quantity in periods 61-90 is
only 53.5 (and not 58.2). Without that extreme outlier, the decrease in quantity in the last
30 periods, in TAB-quadropolies gets even highly significant (p = 0.015)
6the impact of payoff table is immediate, in the first ten periods, subjects with
payoff table produce -10.3% less than subjects without payoff table (N=3:
-0.6%, N=4: -3.5%). Over the course of the experiment, however, this differ-
ence declines, since duopolists in noTAB also learn to collude successfully.
In triopolies, payoff tables seem to be most effective by helping subjects to
cooperate. On average, in subjects TAB produce -20.1% less than their coun-
terparts in noTAB. For N = 4, the payoff table is apparently not so effective in
decreasing contributions although the average difference between both treat-
ments is higher than for N = 2 (-9.8% for N = 4, -5.7% for N = 2). Moreover,
play in N = 4 is often dominated by punishment actions directing the averages
in both treatments to a similar level. These observations are in line with the
finding of Huck et al. (2004) that collusion is rare for markets with N = 4 or
higher.
Table 2 depicts a classification of markets based on average quantities in
periods 61-90. It shows that over all market sizes, there are more collusive
markets in TAB (11 markets, 37% of all markets) than in noTAB (8 mar-
kets, 27%). 11 We define a market as collusive (abbrev. COL) if this market’s
average total quantity is closer to the collusive benchmark than to other two
benchmarks introduced in Section 2; i.e., a duopoly market is classified as col-
lusive if this market’s average total quantity is below 35 while the same market
is classified as a “CNE-market” (CNE) if this market’s average total quantity
lies between 35 and 50. 12
Table 2 Classification of markets according their average quantities in periods 61-90
noTAB TAB
Market size COL CNE COM COL CNE COM
N = 2 5 2 3 5 3 2
N = 3 2 3 5 4 3 3
N = 4 1 5 4 2 2 6
Total 8 10 12 11 8 11
In total, in noTAB, there are 10 markets with average total quantities
around the CNE (8 in TAB). In noTAB, we classify 12 markets as competitive
while there are 11 COM markets in TAB.
The above classification reveals that many markets succeed to collude. In-
terestingly, oligopolies in TAB establish collusion in significantly earlier peri-
ods than markets in noTAB. Figure 2 shows the evolution of collusive markets
for each treatment in blocks of ten periods. As can be seen from the figures,
in the beginning phase (periods 1-20), for all market sizes, in TAB there are
more collusive markets then in noTAB. Aggregated over all market sizes, the
11 Previous studies use similar classifications, see e.g., Fouraker and Siegel (1963) or Huck
et al. (2004).
12 Applying the same logic we label duopoly markets with average quantities above 50 as
competitive (COM).
7difference between both settings is highly significant (U-Test, p = 0.022). The
markets in noTAB, however, catch up during the experiment with the markets
in TAB. Similar to the evolution of average quantities, for N = 3, the differ-
ences between both settings remain stable while they diminish for N = 2 and
N = 4.
Fig. 2 Relative frequency of collusive markets
4.2 Individual Behavior
How do payoff tables influence the individual behavior? Since in our experi-
ment subjects receive detailed feedback about each of the competitors’ quan-
tities and profits, they were able to apply a variety of decision rules. We focus
on rules to which it is often referred in previous studies on quantity setting
markets: Best-reply, collusive response, and imitation. In our game, each com-
petitor is able to unilaterally force the market price to zero by choosing xi = 60.
This choice can be interpreted as a punishment act since in this case the player
who chooses 60 as well as all other competitors obtain zero profits for sure. For
this reason, we consider punishment as a fourth decision rule. In the following,
we define the four rules more precisely. Then we look whether and how often
subjects did choose these rules in the experiment.
Best-Reply (BR): A player i playing a (myopic) best-reply assumes that
the sum of competitors’ quantities will be the same in period t as in period t−1
and sets her actual quantity in period t according to the best-reply function
xti = 30− (Xt−1−i /2) with Xt−1−i being the sum of other competitors’ last period
quantities.
Collusive Response (CR): A player i who applies a collusive response wants
to maximize the joint profits in the market. Thus she chooses xi according
to the formula: xti = 30 − Xt−1−i , i.e., the total quantity including player i’s
quantity equals the monopoly quantity.
8Imitate the successful (IM): An imitator i sets the own quantity to xti =
xt−1j , where i being the imitator and j the most successful competitor in the
previous period, with total quantity Xt−1 < 60 and xt−1j > x
t−1
i .
13
Punishment (PUN): A punisher i chooses xi = 60 to set the market price
to zero.
Which of the rules described above do subjects follow? Are subjects in
TAB more inclined to apply BR than subjects in noTAB since the payoff
table presents them the best-replies in a clear way? Do subjects with pay-
off tables choose more often CR which were easily identifiable? On the other
hand, because of the clarity, one could expect less IM-behavior with payoff
tables. Punishment could be observed more often in noTAB, e.g. as a signal-
ing/disciplining device, if quantities in noTAB are indeed higher (less cooper-
ative) than in TAB where probably there is less need for punishment.
In this study, we are interested in the differences between both information
settings and not in learning behavior. Hence, we focus on exact applications
of the above mentioned rules. Table 3 depicts the absolute and the relative
frequencies of exact applications of the decision rules we observed in our ex-
periments. Relative frequencies refer to the cases in which a decision rule was
applicable which means that a player indeed was able to choose a particular
rule. The percentage of applicable cases are also depicted in Table 3.14
BR was applicable in 87.6% of the cases in noTAB and in 92.4% cases
in TAB. In both settings, however, only less than 10% of the decisions are
actually BR. This is surprising since subjects had all necessary information
to calculate the BR. In TAB, subjects could even read the best-reply directly
from the payoff table. Despite this, subjects in TAB (8.2%) do not choose
significantly more often BR than subjects in noTAB (7.1%).
In noTAB, CR was applicable in 47.1% of all cases (in TAB : 50.8%). Of
these cases, 28.6% were actually CR (in TAB : 37.4%). Hence, in both settings,
CR is the most frequent observed decision rule, in relative as well as in absolute
terms. Subjects in TAB choose more often CR than subjects in noTAB. The
difference between both settings is highest for N = 3. In both settings, the
amount of CR declines with N .
In noTAB, imitation was applicable in 36.9% of all possible cases (37.8%
in TAB). However, subjects applied imitation only in 10.1% of the these cases
(10.9% in TAB). In duopolies imitation is more frequent (20.0% in noTAB,
16.3% in TAB) whereas it is rare in quadropolies (8.3% in noTAB, 7.8% in
TAB). The discrepancy between the imitation numbers in duopolies and in
quadropolies could be due to the ambiguity of the intention of imitational
13 We exclude cases where the total quantity in the market was 60 or higher since in these
case the profits of all competitors were zero, i.e., all competitors were equally successful (or
equally unsuccesful). We also exclude cases where the player i him/herself was (one of) the
most successful competitor(s) in period t−1. In such cases, for player i there is no successful
competitor to copy in period t.
14 Not all the rules were applicable in each period. For example, CR is only applicable if
the total quantity in a market is less than or equal to 30. If the total quantity is greater
than 30, there is no reasonable CR.
9Table 3 Observed decisions in percent
noTAB TAB
BR IM CR PUN Total BR IM CR PUN Total
N = 2 relative 3.4 20.0 37.8 1.0 8.0 16.3 39.3 1.6
app. cases 99.0 24.2 93.4 99.0 98.4 24.9 93.3 99.0
absolute 3.4 4.8 35.3 1.0 44.5 7.9 4.1 36.7 1.6 50.2
N = 3 relative 9.8 8.6 21.6 5.3 6.7 13.2 40.2 2.3
app. cases 89.3 41.5 37.5 99.0 95.4 36.1 55.7 99.0
absolute 8.8 3.6 8.1 5.2 25.7 6.4 4.8 22.4 2.3 35.8
N = 4 relative 7.0 8.3 21.1 7.1 9.6 7.8 29.3 4.7
app. cases 80.5 39.7 30.9 99.0 87.2 45.6 27.7 99.0
absolute 5.6 3.3 6.5 7.0 22.5 8.4 3.6 8.1 4.7 24.7
Total relative 7.1 10.1 28.6 5.2 8.2 10.9 37.4 3.2
app. cases 87.6 36.9 47.1 99.0 92.4 37.8 50.8 99.0
absolute 6.2 3.7 13.5 5.1 28.6 7.6 4.1 19.0 3.2 33.9
decisions. First, subjects may imitate the most succesful competitor if they do
not know what else to do. Sometimes, however, imitation may also occur in
order to send a “message” to others. For example, some subjects choose the
symmetric collusive quantity and that of the (most succesful) competitor with
the highest quantity alternately to signal that the competitor with the highest
quantity also should choose the collusive quantity. It is clear, that this kind of
“signaling” is observed more often if the addressee of the signal can identify
that he or she is the addressee - as in the case of a duopoly.
PUN was applicable with the exception of the first period, i.e., in 99.0% of
possible cases. In noTAB, subjects punish in 5.2% of these cases while in TAB
this percentage decreases to 3.2%. In both settings, the use of punishment
increases with N (Jonckheere-Terpstra-Test, p = 0.052 for noTAB ; p = 0.032
for TAB). This reflects the increasing difficulties to collude when the market
size grows.15
Huck et al. (1999) and Offerman et al. (2002) investigate different learning
theories in a Cournot quadropoly and triopoly setting respectively, in different
treatments with different feedback mechanisms. Huck et al. (1999) find over-
all, imitation seems the better explanation for the adjustment of quantities.
The number of perfect hits of imitation behavior, however, is relatively low
throughout the treatments. In particular, in FULL, the only comparable treat-
ment to our design, 7.9% of the decisions are actually imitate the best, 0.6%
imitate the average, and 1.4% are BR. Huck et al. (1999) do not count CR.
In Offerman et al. (2002) Qqpi is the comparable treatment to our settings.
In this treatment, collusion is found roughly as frequent as the competitive
(Walrasian) outcome. Additionally, the more complicated demand and cost
functions could be a reason that in the latter study one observes more imita-
15 A multinomial logistic regression analysis which we report in the Appendix brings out
similar results with respect to individual choice behavior of the considered decision rules.
10
tion than in our extremely simple setting where cognitive costs of finding the
collusive response may be lower, especially in TAB.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we systemically investigate the effect of payoff tables on subjects’
behavior in Cournot markets with two, three, and four competitors. The only
variation between our two informational settings is the provision of a payoff
table - all other things remaining equal. Hence, any differences between the
both settings of our study can be unambiguously traced back to the presence
(or the absence) of payoff tables. Overall results show that subjects provided
with payoff tables choose more often collusive quantities. Moreover, subjects
with payoff tables manage to collude earlier than subjects without payoff ta-
bles. Towards the end of the experiment, however, the differences between
both settings get smaller. Thus, the length of the experiment seems to be an
important determinant: in experiments with a small number of periods, payoff
tables are more likely to make significant differences. For all market sizes, the
number of collusive markets are higher with payoff tables.
Both ours and the study of Charness et al. (2004) show that payoff tables
have an effect on behavior. In contrast to Charness et al. (2004), however,
we find that payoff tables seem to make behavior more cooperative. Charness
et al. (2004) observe significant reductions of average wages and effort levels
in a gift-exchange game when subjects are provided with payoff tables. One
major difference between our setting and the study of Charness et al. (2004) is
that they investigate an asymmetric game while our setting has a symmetric
structure. In a symmetric game, the payoff table possibly makes subjects more
clear that there are gains from cooperation if all competitors would choose
similar quantities. In contrast, in an asymmetric environment as in the gift-
exchange game, the payoff table may let subjects focus on the inequality of
the situation leading to less gift-exchange than observed normally without
payoff tables. One explanation provided by Charness et al. is that payoff tables
possibly made subjects more clear that in a gift-exchange experiment firms’
marginal benefits from worker’s effort decrease when effort increases. Subjects
realizing this “inefficiency of gifts” at higher wages may provide less effort,
i.e., they may cooperate less than subjects without payoff tables.
The study by Requate and Waichman (2011) and ours complement each
other well in understanding the effect of informational aids in Cournot exper-
iments. While they show that there is no significant differences in behavior
whether subjects use payoff tables or a payoff calculator, we show that the
use of an informational aid at all can make (significant) differences. Requate
and Waichman (2011) investigate only duopolies. Our results with respect to
duopolies are roughly in line with their findings: in the long-run, the duopolies
in noTAB are similarly collusive as duopolies in TAB. We find, however, signif-
icant differences between our settings for triopolies. The question remains open
11
whether for N > 2 there would be (significant) differences between settings
with payoff tables and settings with a payoff calculator.
In the theoretical literature, we find many results on the presence and
absence of information but very little on the significance of information pro-
cessing instruments. This study clearly shows that information-processing aids
have non-negligible effects. Our results show that payoff tables indeed have an
impact on subjects behavior even in a very simple setting. Hence, they might
have even stronger effects in more complicated environments which possibly
demand subjects’ cognitive abilities even more. Thus, from a methodological
point of view, the provision of subjects with payoff tables may be useful and
recommended, especially in complex experimental studies.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Additional Analysis
A comparison of the constant terms reveals that the decision rule CR is chosen
more frequently than the all other decision rules and the remaining category
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Table 4 Multinomial logistic regression
Decision rule Coefficient Rob. Std. Error z p
Other (base outcome)
Best-reply (BR) n -0.101 0.130 -0.78 0.435
treat 0.271 0.228 1.19 0.234
cons -2.228 0.481 -4.62 0.000
Imitation (IM) n -0.364 0.097 -3.72 0.000
treat 0.179 0.150 1.19 0.233
cons -1.836 0.306 -6.00 0.000
Collusive response (CR) n -1.702 0.353 -4.83 0.000
treat 0.528 0.601 0.88 0.380
cons 2.871 1.017 2.82 0.005
Punishment (P) n 0.451 0.314 1.44 0.150
treat -0.430 0.520 -0.83 0.409
cons -4.237 1.043 -4.06 0.000
Std. Err. adjusted for 60 clusters (markets). Number of obs = 18000. Pseudo R2 = 0.0955,
Wald chi2(8) = 40.55, log pseudolikelihood = -15207.035.
“others”. All decision rules but CR are chosen less frequently than the remain-
ing category as the negative signs of the constant terms and the significant
p-values show. For any decision rule, there are no significant differences be-
tween treatments, i.e., the respective rules are chosen in similar percentages
in both treatments. If we look at number effects, we see that the probability
to choose CR and IM decreases with N whereas the probability to choose BR
or P does not change significantly when N incraeses.
6.2 Translation of the Instructions to the Experiment
The Structure of the Experiment. The experiment consists of 100 periods. You
will be randomly assigned to different groups. There are 2 to 4 participants
in each group. The composition of each group does not change throughout
the experiment. The members of a group are competitors on a market for a
specific good. At the beginning of the experiment you will be informed, how
many competitors you have.
The Structure of a Period. You determine your supply x, by choosing a number
out of {0..60}. There are no costs, i.e., the good is produced and supplied
without costs. Depending on your supply and the supply of your competitors,
the total supply X on this market is determined as follows: X =
∑
i xi, where
xi denotes the single supply of the supplier i on the market. The price p
depends on the total supply X as follows:
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p =
{
60−X if X ≤ 60
0 if X > 60
Your profit G is calculated as follows: G = p · x. Your earnings depend on
your final profit.
Feedback at the end of each Period. At the end of each round, each participant
is informed about his profit G and the supplies and profits of his competitors.
The profits of your competitors are determined in the same way as your own
profit. Depending on the profit, every participant is paid a certain amount in
the fictitious currency “Thaler”. The screen shows the profit of the last period
and the cumulated profit (sum of all profits obtained so far).
End of the Experiment and Total Payoffs. From the beginning, the exchange
rate is displayed on the computer screen. At the end of the experiment your cu-
mulated profit will be multiplied with the exchange rate. After the experiment
you will be paid this amount.
Additional instructions for the setting “TAB”. You will be provided with a
payoff table. The lines on this table correspond to your possible supplies out
of {0..60}. The columns correspond to the competitors’ supplies (i.e., sum of
the supplies of your competitors). In the respective fields of the table, you will
find your corresponding profit.
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6.3 The Payoff Table
Fig. 3 Excerpt from the Payoff Table
